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RE-EVALUATING COMPETENCE TO 
STAND TRIAL 
HON. JUSTICE DAVID COLLINS* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The American federal law governing a defendant’s competence to stand trial 
is substantially contained in 18 U.S.C. § 4241, which can be traced to a 1949 
statute, and in Dusky v. United States, a three-paragraph opinion the Supreme 
Court delivered in 1960. The term “competence to stand trial” refers to a 
defendant’s ability to “participate” in her trial.1 It includes those who plead 
guilty2 and those who are to be sentenced.3 This article critically examines the 
current federal law governing a defendant’s competence to stand trial in the 
federal criminal jurisdiction and explains why it is antiquated and no longer fit 
for purpose. It proposes a new test whereby competence would be determined 
by reference to the defendant’s capacity to participate effectively in his trial. 
A. The Federal Law and its Consequences 
Part II focuses on the development of the federal law and its consequences. 
The principal federal statute—§ 4241—has been correctly characterized as a 
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 1.  Douglas Mossman et al., AAPL Practice Guideline for the Forensic Psychiatric Evaluation of 
Competence to Stand Trial, 35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. S3, S3 (2007). 
 2.  In 2016, 97.3% of federal offenders pleaded guilty. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, OVERVIEW 
OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES FISCAL YEAR 2016, at 4 (May 2017). Some authorities have suggested 
that because most defendants plead guilty before trial, the term “competence to stand trial” is misleading. 
They suggest terms such as “adjudicative competence” or “competence to proceed” are more apposite. 
Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: A Theoretical Reformulation, 10 BEHAV. 
SCI. & L. 291 (1992); NORMAN G. POYTHRESS, RICHARD J. BONNIE, JOHN MONAHAN, RANDY OTTO 
& STEVEN K. HOGE, ADJUDICATIVE COMPETENCE–THE MACARTHUR STUDIES (Ronald Roesch et 
al. eds., 2002). The term “competence to stand trial” is, however, well ingrained in American 
jurisprudence as referring to a defendant’s competence at all stages of criminal proceedings, from the 
laying of charges to sentencing. See generally Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993); Drope v. Missouri, 
420 U.S. 162 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). That is the way the competence to stand trial 
concept is referred to in this article. 
 3.  United States v. Gigante, 982 F. Supp. 140 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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“complex enactment.”4 The Supreme Court’s opinion in Dusky v. United States5 
did not alleviate deficiencies in the current federal law to any significant extent. 
The consequences of a finding that a defendant is not competent to stand trial 
include significant curtailment of her liberty, which is rarely perceived as a 
victory. It is therefore not surprising to find cases in which a defendant has 
expressly instructed her attorney not to challenge her competence to stand trial.6 
B. Deficiencies in the Current Law 
Part III examines the jurisprudential and institutional difficulties arising from 
deficiencies in the current federal law, including the narrowness of the criteria for 
incompetence. Consequently, many defendants with significant mental illness 
have been found competent to stand trial.7 This in turn has contributed to an 
intolerable phenomenon in United States prisons, namely the “criminalization of 
mental illness.”8 One estimate suggests there are ten times as many people with 
severe mental illnesses incarcerated in the United States as there are in 
psychiatric hospitals.9 Overall, more than 1.2 million people with mental illness 
are incarcerated in the United States.10 
The narrowness of the qualifying criteria in the current federal tests has also 
led to ad hoc and inconsistent outcomes for defendants who are incapacitated by 
conditions that do not fit the current criteria. Defendants with profound 
personality disorders—which are not a mental disease or defect—and those who 
suffer from neurological disorders are examples of defendants that have created 
challenges for federal courts. Other forms of incapacity are not pursued in this 
Article but demonstrate the same point. For example, defendants who are 
incapacitated through medication are dealt with differently from those 
incapacitated by illegal drugs, even though both may exhibit identical symptoms 
 
 4.  FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES 51 (6th ed. 
Mar. 2013). 
 5.  362 U.S. 402 (1960). 
 6.  See Rodney J. Uphoff, Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer in Representing the Mentally 
Impaired Defendant: Zealous Advocate or Officer of the Court?, WIS. L. REV. 65, 77–98 (1988) (discussing 
State v. Johnson, 395 N.W.2d 176 (Wis. 1986)). 
 7.  See generally United States v. Mitchell, 706 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1193 (D. Utah. 2010) (finding the 
defendant competent to stand trial despite his extreme religious beliefs); United States v. Riggin, 732 F. 
Supp. 958, 964 65 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (finding the defendant competent to stand trial although his fixation 
on the termination of his employment constituted a personality disorder); Bradley v. Preston, 263 F. 
Supp. 283, 285 (D.D.C. 1967) (finding the defendant competent to stand trial notwithstanding his claim 
of amnesia). 
 8.  See generally RISDON N. SLATE, JACQUELINE K. BUFFINGTON–VOLLUM & W. WESLEY 
JOHNSON, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF MENTAL ILLNESS: CRISIS & OPPORTUNITY FOR THE JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 43 (2d ed. 2013). 
 9.  E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., THE TREATMENT OF PERSONS 
WITH MENTAL ILLNESS IN PRISONS AND JAILS: A STATE SURVEY 6 (2014). 
 10.  Am. Psychological. Ass’n, Press Release: Mental Illness Not Usually Linked to Crime, Research 
Finds (Apr. 21, 2014), http://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2014/04/mental-illness-crime.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/N8LL-3NMY]. 
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and suffer the same inability to participate in their trials.11 Other defendants who 
suffer from physical disabilities,12 such as deafness13 or cancer,14 can also face 
hurdles when demonstrating their incapacity to stand trial. 
Also troubling is the assessment of unrepresented defendants, which has 
produced a disconcerting body of jurisprudence that attempts to distinguish 
between a defendant’s competence to plead guilty and his competence to conduct 
a defended hearing without counsel. 
Further issues have developed in relation to the way the concept of rationality 
has unfolded in cases decided after Dusky. The requirement that a defendant be 
able to consult with his lawyer with a “reasonable degree of rational 
understanding” and have “a rational . . . understanding of the proceedings against 
him” has not been universally understood.15 
There are also challenges under the current law for clinicians. Assessing 
defendants’ competence to stand trial has become “a core skill” in forensic 
psychiatry.16 Competency to stand trial evaluations are also now “by far the most 
frequently adjudicated”17 form of competency in the judicial system.18 
The analysis in Part III leads to the conclusion that the current federal law 
governing a defendant’s competence to stand trial is antiquated and no longer fit 
for purpose. The challenge that then arises is to propose a new test for assessing 
a defendant’s competence to stand trial. 
C. Guiding Principles 
Any test for assessing a defendant’s competence to stand trial must be firmly 
grounded upon an understanding of why the criminal justice system should only 
 
 11.  Compare Whitehead v. Wainwright, 447 F. Supp. 897, 899 900 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (concluding the 
defendant was incompetent to stand trial based on effects of medication dispensed by jail staff during 
trial), aff’d, 609 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1980), with Watts v. Singletary, 87 F.3d 1282, 1284 85 (11th Cir. 1996) 
(concluding the defendant was competent to stand trial though he slept through much of his trial as a 
result of his late-night crack cocaine use). 
 12.  Physical incompetence is not covered by any federal competency statute and is treated as an 
issue for trial courts to assess on a case by case basis by reference to five factors identified in United 
States v. Doran, 328 F. Supp. 1261, 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
 13.  Compare State v. Burnett, No. 1638, 2005 WL 32797 (Ohio. Ct. App. 2005) (upholding the trial 
court’s determination that the defendant’s deaf-mute condition rendered him incompetent to stand trial), 
with United States v. Jones, 876 F. Supp. 395, 397 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding the defendant competent to 
stand trial despite a serious heart condition). 
 14.  Compare United States v. DeNunzio, 174 F. Supp. 3d 582 (D. Mass. 2016) (finding a defendant 
recovering from chemotherapy physically competent to stand trial and likely mentally competent to stand 
trial), with United States v. Reddy, No. 01 CR 0058, 2003 WL 22339464 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding a 
defendant under treatment for lung cancer incompetent to stand trial). 
 15.  Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). 
 16.  Mossman et al., supra note 1, at S3. 
 17.   GARY B. MELTON, JOHN PETRILA, NORMAN G. POYTHRESS & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, 
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH 
PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 125 (3d ed. 2007). 
 18.  See Derek Chiswick, Fitness to Stand Trial and Plead, Mutism and Deafness, in PRINCIPLES AND 
PRACTICE OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 171 (Robert Bluglass & Paul Bowden eds., 1990) (discussing the 
legal significance of competency evaluations). 
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place on trial those who are competent. The following four principles underpin 
that requirement. 
First, defendants who are forced to stand trial in circumstances where they 
are not competent to do so are deprived of most of their basic constitutional fair 
trial rights.19 These rights—which can be traced from the Code of Hammurabi,20 
through Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta,21 to the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the Constitution—are recognized internationally as being 
fundamental to a fair and legitimate trial.22 The key rationale for the competence 
to stand trial requirement is that it promotes fairness for a defendant by 
protecting her right to defend herself and ensures that she is not inappropriately 
exposed to the risks of a criminal trial without access to fair trial rights.23 
Second, the integrity and legitimacy of the criminal justice system hinges in 
part upon holding those who have breached criminal laws accountable for their 
wrongdoing. To hold a defendant truly accountable, he must understand the 
reasons why he has been prosecuted, convicted, and punished. Absent such 
understanding, the criminal justice system is merely a vehicle to appease the 
aggrieved rather than to genuinely punish an offender. 
Third, allowing the prosecution of an incompetent defendant undermines 
society’s interest in having a reliable criminal justice system and creates a greater 
risk of unreliable verdicts.24 The state’s need to uphold the integrity and 
legitimacy of the criminal justice system by ensuring only competent defendants 
are tried was emphasized in United States v. Chisholm:25 
It would be . . . a reproach to justice and our institutions, if a human being . . . were 
compelled to go to trial at a time when he is not sufficiently in possession of his mental 
faculties to enable him to make a rational and proper defense. The latter would be a 
more grievous error than the former; since in the one case an individual would go 
unwhipped of justice, while in the other the great safeguards which the law adopts in 
the punishment of crime and the upholding of justice would be rudely invaded by the 
tribunal whose sacred duty it is to uphold the law in all its integrity. 
Finally, the American criminal justice system, like that in cognate 
jurisdictions, is founded upon respect for the autonomy and dignity of all 
participants in a trial.26 A defendant’s right to autonomy and self-determination 
is compromised if she is placed on trial in circumstances where she lacks the 
capacity to make trial decisions that are reserved for her and not her lawyer.27 
 
 19.  Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 139–40 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 20.  DINAH SHELTON, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 165 
(2013). 
 21.  TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW 10 (2010). 
 22.  G.A. Res. 217 A (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 7, 8, 10 & 11 (Dec. 10, 1948); 
European Convention on Human Rights, as amended by Protocol Nos. 11 and 14, art. 6 (Nov. 4, 1950). 
 23.  Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 349 (1996); see also Stephen J. Morse, Involuntary 
Competence, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 311 (2003). 
 24.  Cooper, 517 U.S. at 366 67. 
 25.  149 F. 284, 288 (S.D. Ala. 1906). 
 26.  R v. Swain, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933 (Can.). 
 27.  See Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004) (affirming that the defendant “has ‘the ultimate 
authority’” to determine the exercise or waiver of certain basic trial rights); Faretta v. California, 422 
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Decisions in this category include the defendant’s right to decide how she 
pleads,28 whether she testifies,29 whether to waive trial by jury,30 and to adduce 
evidence.31 These rights are not meaningful if a defendant lacks the capacity to 
exercise them.32 
D. A Proposed New Test 
Part IV proposes a new test that focuses upon a defendant’s ability to 
participate effectively in his trial. The effective participation test is a unitary test, 
which covers all phases of a criminal trial and involves a judicial assessment of 
four functions:33 
1. Understanding: a defendant’s capacity to understand relevant information including 
the charge he faces, the trial process, the role of participants in the trial, the evidence, 
and the purpose and possible outcomes of the trial. 
2. Evaluation: a defendant’s capacity to process information, particularly the case 
against him, trial directions, and the impact of that information on the defense. 
3. Decision-making: a defendant’s capacity to make decisions normally required of the 
defendant during a trial, including how to plead and whether to give evidence or put 
forward a particular defense. This also concerns the ability of an unrepresented 
defendant to conduct his defense in a way that does not breach his fair trial rights. 
4. Communication: a defendant’s capacity to communicate his account of his case, and 
his capacity to instruct his lawyer and to give evidence if he elects to do so. 
Finally, Part V examines why the effective participation test offers significant 
advantages over the current federal tests. Those reasons are linked to the four 
governing principles set out in this introduction. 
E. State Legislation 
This article focuses upon the federal law governing a defendant’s competence 
to stand trial. Thirty-three states do, however, have provisions similar to § 4241, 
and twelve states have legislation that reflects the test set out by the Supreme 
Court in Dusky. Thus, many of the conclusions drawn can apply with equal effect 
to those states. 
 
U.S. 806, 835 36 (1975) (holding that by “forcing . . . the defendant to accept against his will a state-
appointed public defender,” the trial court violated the defendant’s “constitutional right to conduct his 
own defense”); Stephen J. Morse, Mental Disorder and Criminal Law, 101 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 
885, 911 (2011) 
 28.  Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7 8 (1966). 
 29.  Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51 53 (1987). 
 30.  Adams v. United States ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 277 79 (1942). 
 31.  Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 137 (1992). 
 32.  See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 (“The right to defend is personal.”); see also Erica J. Hashimoto, 
Resurrecting Autonomy: the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Control the Case, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1147 (2010). 
 33.  Russ Scott, Fitness for Trial in Queensland, 14 PSYCH., PSYCHOL. & L. 327, 341 (2007). 
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II 
THE CURRENT LAW, HOW IT EVOLVED, AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
To understand the deficiencies in the current federal law and why reform is 
desirable, it is helpful to first understand the current law and how it evolved. 
A. Early Common Law 
The common law of the seventeenth century recognized that 
If a man in his sound memory commits a capital offense and before his arraignment he 
becomes absolutely mad, he ought not by law to be arraigned during such his phrenzy, 
but be remitted to prison until that incapacity be removed; the reason is, because he 
cannot advisedly plead to the indictment . . . 34 
Many of the early leading common law cases concerning a defendant’s 
competence to stand trial involved defendants who were deaf and mute. In such 
cases, a jury would be empaneled to determine if the defendant was “mute of 
malice” or mute ex visitatione Dei (by visitation of God). Those adjudged “mute 
of malice” were subjected to torture in order to force a plea.35 Those who were 
found to be mute by visitation of God would have a plea of not guilty entered on 
their behalf. Dyson’s Case36 is an example of an early nineteenth century case in 
which the defendant was found to be mute by visitation of God. Parke J 
instructed the jury that if they found Dyson lacked “intelligence enough to 
understand the nature of the proceedings against her” due to the “defect of her 
faculties” then the jury “ought to find her not sane.” This was the verdict the jury 
duly returned. Dyson’s Case foreshadowed a distinction which emerged in 
twentieth century jurisprudence between factual competence (having the ability 
to plead) and the more refined concept of decisional competence (having the 
ability to, for example, give evidence and be cross-examined). 
Five years after Dyson’s Case, Alderson B gave his seminal direction in R v. 
Pritchard,37 in which he asked the jury to consider if Pritchard had “sufficient 
intellect to comprehend the course of proceedings on the trial, so as to make a 
proper defense.” Alderson B’s directions in Pritchard recognized it was 
insufficient for a defendant to simply have the capacity to plead. The early 
common law also required that a trial not continue if the defendant lacked the 
cognitive ability to participate in her trial. Also significant is how the early 
common law blurred a finding of competence to stand trial with insanity. As will 
be explained later, vestiges of this can still be seen in § 4241. 
 
 34.  SIR MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 34–35 (Sollom Emlyn ed., 
1736); see also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES 24). The word “advisedly” used by Hale and Blackstone was defined at the time to 
mean “deliberately; purposely; by design; prudently.” See “Advisedly,” SAMUEL JOHNSON, A 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Brandi Besalke ed., 1755), 
http://johnsonsdictionaryonline.com/?p=15235 [https://perma.cc/3HXJ-GT9P]. 
 35.  MELTON ET AL., supra note 17, at 126. 
 36.  Esther Dyson’s Case (1831) 7 Car. & P. 305, 307 (Eng.). 
 37.  R v. Pritchard, (1836) 173 Eng. Rep. 135, 7 Car. & P. 303. 
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The Pritchard test for competence to stand trial was adopted in nineteenth 
century American cases,38 where it was construed to mean that a defendant 
lacked competence to stand trial if he lacked the intellectual abilities to advance 
a “rational defense.” This requirement can be traced to Youtsey v. United States,39 
in which the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the retrial of a defendant 
who suffered debilitating epilepsy that rendered him “unable to advise his 
counsel as to his defense.”40 The court explained that when issues arose 
concerning a defendant’s capacity to stand trial, the trial court must determine 
whether or not “the accused [could] make a rational defense.”41 The court also 
said that a trial court should ascertain if the defendant has “the mental capacity . 
. . to understand the proceedings against him . . . rationally advise with his counsel 
as to his defense” and “rationally defend himself.”42 The reference to a 
defendant’s capacity to rationally advise with counsel as to a defense echoed that 
part of the early common law described by Hale and Blackstone as the need for 
a defendant to have the capacity to plead “advisedly” to an indictment.43 Aspects 
of the rationality criterion articulated in Youtsey ultimately became embedded in 
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Dusky. 
B. 18 U.S.C. § 4241 
The origins of 18 U.S.C. § 4241 can be traced to a meeting of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States in September 1942, during which a committee 
of federal judges was appointed to study, in cooperation with the Attorney 
General, “the treatment accorded by the federal courts to insane persons charged 
with crime.”44 The Judicial Conference proceeded on the basis that issues 
concerning a defendant’s competence to stand trial should be considered in 
conjunction with an examination of the way insane persons were dealt with in 
federal courts, and its final report reflected some merging of these issues. This 
can be traced to an arguable legal lacuna that prevented federal authorities from 
detaining criminal defendants who were insane because jurisdiction over such 
persons was thought to reside exclusively within the parens patriae jurisdiction of 
the states.45 In October 1946, the Judicial Conference adopted with some 
 
 38.  Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 9 (N.Y. 1847); State v. Harris, 53 N.C. (8 Jones) 136 (1860). 
 39.  97 F. 937 (6th Cir. 1899). 
 40.  Id. at 942. 
 41.  Id. at 943 (citing 2 Bish. Cr. Proc. at § 666); Guagando v. State, 41 Tex. 626, 630 (1874); see also 
R v. Frith, 22 How. Str. Tr. 307; R v. Berry, (1876) 1 Q.B.D. 447–50; R v. Pritchard, (1836) 173 Eng. Rep. 
135, 7 Car. & P. 303 
 42.  Youtsey, 97 F. at 944, 944 47. 
 43.  JOHNSON, supra note 34. 
 44.  HARLAN F. STONE ET AL., REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. 18–19 (Sept. 
1942); see Greenwood v. United States, 219 F.2d 376, 380–85 (8th Cir. 1955). 
 45.  Federal Hospitalization of Insane Defendants Under Section 4246 of the Criminal Code, 64 YALE 
L.J. 1019, 1070–71 (1955); CALVERT MAGRUDER ET AL., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES REPORT OF COMMITTEE TO STUDY TREATMENT ACCORDED BY FEDERAL COURTS TO 
INSANE PERSONS CHARGED WITH CRIME 7–9 (1945); Care and Custody of Insane Persons Charged with 
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amendments a draft bill prepared by the committee.46 The bill was eventually 
passed into law on September 7, 1949 and became incorporated into federal law 
as 18 U.S.C. § 4244. 
Congress amended the provisions of § 4244 in the Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act of 1984. That Act has been described as “the most radical change in 
federal criminal law in the history of [the United States].”47 While the act made 
many profound changes to federal criminal law, the changes to the competence 
to stand trial provisions of § 4244 were comparatively minor.48 The 1984 
provisions concerning the competence of a defendant to stand trial became 
codified as § 4241. 
Four changes were made between § 4244 and § 4241. First, § 4244 permitted 
motions to challenge competence to stand trial from the time of a defendant’s 
arrest. Following the 1984 amendments, however, such a motion may only be 
raised under § 4241 after the commencement of the prosecution.49 Second, § 4244 
required a psychiatric or psychological report before a competence hearing was 
conducted, whereas § 4241(b) confers discretion on the court to order such a 
report. Third, § 4244 was silent on the standard of proof required, whereas § 
4241(c) stipulates the “preponderance of the evidence” standard of proof applies. 
Fourth, § 4244 referred to a defendant being “presently insane or otherwise so 
mentally incompetent as to be unable to understand the proceedings against him 
or properly assist in his own defense.” On the other hand, § 4241(d) refers to a 
defendant “presently . . . suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him 
mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and 
consequence of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.” 
Section 4241’s reference to a defendant suffering “from a mental disease or 
defect” bears similarity to aspects of the M’Naghten test for insanity.50 That test 
provides that a defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity if at the time of the 
alleged offense she was suffering from “such a defect of reason, from disease of 
the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing.” More 
significantly, the phrase “mental disease or defect” in § 4241 replicated that part 
of the insanity test that was incorporated into federal law in Durham v. United 
States.51 The Durham test, however, ceased to be part of federal law following the 
passing of the Insanity Defense Reform Act 1984. The federal insanity defense 
now requires a defendant to prove that “at the time of the commission of the acts 
 
Federal Offenses: Hearing on S. 850 Before the Sub–Comm. of the S. Com. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong. 5 
(1948). 
 46.  REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. 18 (Oct. 1946), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/1946-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6T8-97NM]. 
 47.  Kenneth R. Feinberg, The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984: New Approaches to 
Federal Criminal Law, in COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1984, at 249 (Practising Law Inst. 
ed., 1985). 
 48.  United States v. Williams, 998 F.2d 258, 265 n.16 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 49.  18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2006). 
 50.  M’Naghten’s case, [1843] 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (HL). 
 51.  214 F.2d 862, 874–75 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 
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constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or 
defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his 
acts.”52 Thus, the federal statutory tests for insanity and incompetence are both 
confined to defendants who suffer, albeit to different degrees, a mental disease 
or defect. This reflects a lingering vestige of the early nineteenth century common 
law under which those who were found incompetent to stand trial were deemed 
to be insane. 
C. Dusky v. United States53 
In 1958, Dusky, who had a history of psychiatric illness, was charged with 
kidnapping a 15-year-old girl in Kansas and taking her to Missouri, where two of 
Dusky’s accomplices raped her. Following his arrest, he was referred for a mental 
health evaluation. Dusky, who denied all memory of the events, was found by 
one psychiatrist to be suffering schizophrenia but nevertheless “oriented as to 
time place and person.” A second psychiatrist reported that Dusky could not 
“properly assist” his trial counsel because of his inability to “properly interpret 
the meaning of the things that had happened.” A third psychiatrist confirmed 
Dusky suffered from schizophrenia. A federal district court ruled that Dusky was 
competent to stand trial because he was oriented in time and place and because 
he was able to provide some information to his attorney about the kidnapping 
incident. Dusky was convicted and sentenced to 45 years’ imprisonment. The 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Dusky’s conviction and sentence.54 
Because it is so brief, it is difficult to extract significant assistance from the 
Supreme Court’s opinion. In three paragraphs, the Court granted Dusky’s 
petition for certiorari, quashed his conviction, and remanded his case to the 
district court for a new hearing to determine if he was competent to stand trial.55 
More assistance can, however, be derived from the Solicitor General’s brief.56 In 
the brief, he set out his concerns that the psychiatric evidence relating to Dusky’s 
competence to stand trial was equivocal and that the trial court appeared to have 
given insufficient weight to the medical evidence that Dusky was suffering from 
delusions and hallucinations and required tranquilizers during his trial. The 
Solicitor General was also concerned that the trial judge had considered it 
sufficient that Dusky was orientated as to time and place and had some 
recollection of events. The Solicitor General said: 
The test must be whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with 
his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding – and whether he has a 
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.57 
 
 52.  18 U.S.C. § 17. 
 53.  362 U.S. 402 (1960). 
 54.  Dusky v. United States, 271 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1959). 
 55.  Dusky, 361 U.S. 402. Dusky was again found to be competent to stand trial. He was convicted 
following his retrial and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment. 
 56.  J. Lee Rankin, Solicitor General, Memorandum for the United States In the Supreme Court of 
the United States, No. 504 Misc; Dusky, 362 U.S. at 1–16. 
 57.  Rankin, supra note 56, at 11. 
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The Court agreed in all respects with the position argued by the Solicitor 
General and adopted his proposed test for determining whether a defendant is 
competent to stand trial. 
Some commentators have suggested that there are just two prongs to the 
Dusky test: “the defendant’s capacity to understand the criminal process as it 
applies to him or her . . . and the defendant’s ability to function in that process, 
primarily through consulting with counsel in the preparation of a defense.”58 
Other authorities have suggested the Dusky test may have three discrete 
requirements,59 or that in its subsequent opinion in Drope v. Missouri60 the 
Supreme Court added a further prong, namely an ability “to assist in preparing 
[a] defense.”61 
At issue in Drope was whether the defendant had been deprived of his right 
to a fair trial when the trial judge declined to conduct a competency hearing. Prior 
to trial, psychiatric evidence raised questions about Drope’s competence to stand 
trial. Those issues were compounded when, during the trial, Drope attempted to 
take his own life and was hospitalized. The Missouri legislation governing the 
competence of a defendant to stand trial was in all material respects the same as 
§ 4241. In delivering the Court’s opinion, Chief Justice Burger paraphrased the 
law in the following way: 
It has long been accepted that a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the 
capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult 
with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.62 
No reference was made to the “rationality” components of the Dusky test 
because the Missouri statute that governed Drope’s case, like § 4241, contains no 
reference to “rationality.” In effect, Drope merged parts of the Dusky test with 
the Missouri legislation and in doing so failed to refer to the rationality 
components of Dusky. 
The divergence of views in the literature and case law concerning the precise 
requirements of the Dusky test highlights uncertainty about what the 
Supreme Court meant. The following elements may, however, be extracted from 
the Supreme Court’s decision. First, the test focuses upon the defendant’s present 
abilities. This draws a temporal distinction between competence to stand trial and 
the defense of insanity, which focuses upon the defendant’s state of mind at the 
 
 58.  MELTON ET AL., supra note 17, at 127; Alan R. Felthous, Competence to Stand Trial Should 
Require Rational Understanding, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 19 (2011). 
 59.  RICHARD ROGERS & DANIEL W. SHUMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF FORENSIC PRACTICE: 
MENTAL HEALTH AND CRIMINAL LAW 154–57 (2006). Those requirements are that a defendant have: 
sufficient present ability to consult with his or her lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding; a factual understanding of the proceedings; and a rational understanding of the 
proceedings. 
 60.  420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975). 
 61.  United States v. Duhon, 104 F. Supp. 2d 663, 670 (W.D. La. 2000); Richard J. Bonnie, The 
Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 539, 539–601 
(1993); American Bar Association, Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards, 13 MED. & PHYSICAL 
DISABILITY L. REP., March–April 1989, at 169. 
 62.  Drope, 420 U.S. at 171. 
COLLINS - BOOK PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2019  4:44 PM 
No. 2 2019] RE-EVALUATING COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL 167 
time of the alleged offense. Second, the test focuses on two trial tasks: the 
defendant’s capacity to consult with her lawyer and her understanding of the 
proceedings against her. Third, the test concerns the defendant’s actual capacity 
in terms of “ability” and “understanding” and not her willingness to participate 
in the proceedings or communicate with counsel. Fourth, the Court drew an 
important distinction between a defendant’s factual and rational understanding 
of the proceeding. The rationality test requires a qualitative assessment of a 
defendant’s capacity to assist in her defense and have a rational understanding of 
the proceeding, which is discussed further in Part III. 
D. The Key Features and Consequences of the Current Law 
The threshold for initiating an assessment of a defendant’s competence to 
stand trial is satisfied if a bona fide doubt is raised about the defendant’s 
competence.63 This low threshold is anchored upon the due process provisions of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. There is, however, a considerable disconnect 
between this low procedural threshold and the high substantive bar to 
determining that a defendant is incompetent. 
A consequence of the way that the Dusky test and § 4241 are framed is that 
even defendants with significant mental illness may be adjudged competent. A 
defendant diagnosed with or presenting signs of a significant mental illness may 
nevertheless satisfy the balance of the criteria set out in the Dusky test and § 
4241.64 Thus, “not every manifestation of mental illness demonstrates 
incompetence to stand trial; rather, the evidence must indicate a present inability 
to assist counsel or understand the charges. Likewise, neither low intelligence, 
 
 63.  Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966). 
 64.  See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 308 (1989) (noting, in the context of an Eighth 
Amendment challenge to the death penalty, that the jury had found the defendant competent despite his 
“organic brain damage” and “mild to moderate retardation”), overruled on other grounds by Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002); Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 193–95 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding a 
defendant with dysthmic disorder competent to stand trial); United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34, 46–
47 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding no clear error in the trial court’s determination of competency, despite the 
defendant’s potential delusional ideals); United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 245 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding 
no clear error in the trial court’s determination of competency, despite the defendant’s reference to 
previous psychiatric problems); Moody v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding no clear 
error in the magistrate’s finding of competency where evidence of the defendant’s brain injuries was 
contradicted by the state’s witnesses); Oats v. Singletary, 141 F.3d 1018, 1025–26 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(concluding that a state court finding of competency was supported by the record, despite evidence of 
“mental retardation, organic brain damage, and history of substance abuse”); Miles v. Dorsey, 61 F.3d 
1459, 1472–73 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding no clear error in the trial court’s determination of competency, 
despite the defendant’s evidence of intellectual disability, mental illness, and substance abuse); United 
States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding no clear error in the trial court’s 
determination of competency, claims of the defendant’s memory lapses and illiteracy notwithstanding); 
Wolf v. United States, 430 F.2d 443, 444–45 (10th Cir. 1970) (upholding the denial of the defendant’s 
motion to vacate sentence despite evidence of his long history of mental illness); People v. Baugh, 832 
N.E. 2d 903, 915–16 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (concluding the defendant was competent to stand trial despite 
his narcolepsy); Lawrence v. State, 169 S.W. 3d 319 (Tex. App. 2005) (holding that, despite his “rambling 
speech, confused thoughts, and incomprehensible answers,” evidence was insufficient to suggest the 
defendant was incompetent to stand trial). 
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nor mental deficiency, nor bizarre, volatile and irrational behavior can be 
equated with mental incompetence to stand trial.”65 
The consequences of finding a defendant incompetent may be very profound. 
Under § 4241(d) a defendant found to be not competent to stand trial is placed 
in the custody of the Attorney General and hospitalized “for treatment in a 
suitable facility.”66 The defendant may be detained for a “reasonable period”67 
initially, not exceeding four months, or “for an additional reasonable period of 
time.”68 If, after a reasonable period of time, the treating facility certifies the 
defendant has recovered, the court is required to hold another competency 
hearing. If the court holds the defendant has recovered, it orders that the 
defendant be discharged from the facility and sets the case for trial. Where a 
defendant does not recover, or, where he is found to be still incompetent, he may 
be released from the treating facility provided he will not pose a substantial risk 
of causing injury to another person or serious damage to the property of another 
person.69 Otherwise he is held in the custody of the Attorney General. This 
requirement is subject to the Supreme Court’s holdings in Jackson v. Indiana70 
that the indefinite commitment of a defendant solely on the basis of his 
incompetence to stand trial violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the 
duration of a defendant’s commitment must bear some relationship to the 
purpose for which he is detained. 
The complexities arising from the intersection of legal and clinical roads 
adversely affect the liberty of defendants found incompetent to stand trial and 
placed in a treatment facility. From a legal perspective, the purpose of treatment 
is to restore the defendant back to competency.71 But from a clinical perspective, 
the rehabilitation of the patient is the primary focus.72 The consequences of a 
defendant being found incompetent to stand trial are even more significant when 
one reviews the frequency with which competency findings are made in the 
United States. Between 50,000 and 60,000 defendants undergo a competence 
assessment each year,73 of whom approximately 15,000 are found not to be 
competent.74 It is therefore essential that any test for assessing competence 
ensures accuracy and reflects the principles set out in Part I. 
 
 65.  Burket, 208 F.3d at 192 (citing Medina v. Singletary, 59 F.3d 1095, 1106–07 (11th Cir. 1995)). 
 66.  § 4241(d) 
 67.  § 4241(d)(1) 
 68.  § 4241(d)(2) 
 69.  18 U.S.C. § 4246; see also Duhon, 104 F. Supp. at 663 (discussing the applicability of § 4246.). 
 70.  406 U.S. 715, 731–38 (1972). 
 71.  18 U.S.C. § 4241(d). 
 72.  This intersection raises numerous issues that are beyond the scope of this article but have been 
explored elsewhere. See generally Debra A. Pinals, Where Two Roads Meet: Restoration of Competence 
to Stand Trial From a Clinical Perspective, 31 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 81 (2005). 
 73.  Douglas R. Morris & Nathaniel J. DeYoung, Psycholegal Abilities and Restoration of 
Competence to Stand Trial, 30 BEHAV. SCI. &. L. 710 (2012). 
 74.  Gianni Pirelli, William H. Gottdiener & Patricia A. Zapf, A Meta–Analytic Review of 
Compentency to Stand Trial Research, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1, 3 (2011); Patricia A. Zapf & 
Ronald Roesch, Competency to Stand Trial: A Guide for Evaluators, in THE HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC 
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III 
DEFICIENCIES IN THE CURRENT LAW 
The brevity of the Supreme Court’s opinion meant that the Dusky test failed 
to address several issues concerning a defendant’s competence to stand trial. 
Soon after it was decided, one federal judge bemoaned that it was “not overly 
helpful in regard to the competency to stand trial question . . . unhappiness with 
Dusky is produced by the fact that the Supreme Court said so little as to why it 
held what it did.”75 This has led to inconsistencies in the way the test has been 
applied by federal courts. 
Similarly, § 4241 suffers from having a narrow target, namely defendants who 
have a “mental disease or defect” that renders them “mentally incompetent.” 
This test bypasses defendants who may lack competence to stand trial for other 
reasons. This narrow focus has also generated issues concerning the way 
competence assessments are undertaken and has led to concerns that judges are 
abdicating their judicial responsibilities in favor of health experts. 
The deficiencies in the current federal law can be divided into jurisprudential 
and institutional shortcomings. The jurisprudential shortcomings will be 
demonstrated by examining the limited scope of the current tests, the problems 
stemming from Supreme Court opinions concerning unrepresented defendants, 
and the misunderstandings concerning the “rationality” component of the Dusky 
test. The institutional shortcomings will be demonstrated by explaining the 
challenges posed by clinical methodologies and the difficulties that lawyers and 
judges face in understanding and responding to the current federal tests. 
A. Jurisprudential Shortcomings 
1. Personality disorders 
The medical criteria for diagnosing a personality disorder are not the same as 
those for mental disease. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-5), published by the American Psychiatric Association, the 
International Statistical Classification of Diseases, and Related Health Problems 
(ICD-10), published by the World Health Organization, recognize that 
personality disorders are a form of mental disorder, but are not mental diseases. 
Thus, a personality disorder may not necessarily be a “mental disease or defect” 
under § 4241. 
 
PSYCHOLOGY 305, 326 n.1 (Irving B. Weiner & Allen K. Hess eds., 3d ed. 2006); Daniel C. Murrie et al., 
Opinion Formation in Evaluation of Competence to Stand Trial, Results from 8,146 Evaluations, 24 
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 113 (2006). The Administrative Office of the United States Courts has stated that 
Federal Magistrate Judges conducted 510 criminal competency proceedings in the twelve-month period 
ending September 30, 2016; however, the Office does not publish statistics on the number of competency 
hearings conducted by Federal District Court Judges. See UNITED STATES COURTS, Table M–4—U.S. 
Magistrate Judges—U.S. Magistrate Judges Judicial Business (Sept. 2016), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/m-4/judicial-business/2016/09/30 [https://perma.cc/M8F5-
VMNV]. 
 75.  John W. Oliver, Judicial Hearings to Determine Mental Competency to Stand Trial, 39 F.R.D. 
533, 543 (1965). 
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The courts have struggled to define the relevance of personality disorders to 
a defendant’s competency to stand trial. Personality disorders are described in 
the DSM-5 as a class of mental disorder characterized by enduring maladaptive 
patterns of behavior, cognition, and inner experience, exhibited across many 
contexts and deviating markedly from those accepted by the individual’s 
culture.76 Examples of personality disorders include paranoid, narcissistic, and 
obsessive-compulsive personality conditions. One commentator has recently 
observed that it is unclear whether personality disorders can ever qualify as a 
mental illness and that “[m]ost courts that have addressed the question have held 
that they do not, but their findings on this issue are muddled or have been limited 
to the diagnosis before them.”77 Factors that have contributed to judicial 
confusion about the significance of personality disorders include the lack of 
precision around the diagnostic categorization of some personality disorders;78 
the high incidence of personality disorders in some groups in society, including 
among defendants in criminal trials;79 and the difficulty of identifying where, on 
a continuum of a personality disorder, questions about competence are triggered. 
In some cases, however, courts have adopted a pragmatic response to this 
issue. In United States v. Veatch, for example, the court found that the defendant 
understood what was happening at his trial, but “his severe personality disorder 
. . . wrought with paranoid, narcissistic and antisocial traits, rendered him 
incapable of effectively assisting counsel in his defense or conducting his own 
defense.”80 While this approach achieved a laudable outcome, it required the 
Court to disregard the qualifying criteria in § 4241. 
In contrast, other federal cases have said a “personality disorder is separate 
and distinct from a mental disease or defect.”81 United States v. Diehl Armstrong 
said, for example, “[t]here is uncontradicted evidence . . . that, while bipolar 
disorder is considered a serious ‘mental disease or defect’ for purposes of 
establishing an individual’s mental competence, a personality disorder is not.”82 
United States v. McKinney83 further illustrates the distinction that is often 
drawn between personality disorders and “severe mental illness.”84 McKinney 
 
 76.  AM. PSYCHIAT. ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
646–49 (5th ed. 2013). 
 77.  E. Lea Johnston, Communication and Competence for Self–Representation, 84 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2121, 2160 (2016). 
 78.  Thomas A. Widiger & Timothy J. Trull, Plate Techtonics in the Classification of Personality 
Disorder, 62 AM. PSYCHOL. 71 (2003). 
 79.  Stephen D. Hart, Commentary: The Forensic Relevance of Personality Disorder, 30 J. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 510 (2012). 
 80.  842 F. Supp. 480, 482 (W.D. Okla. 1993). 
 81.  United States v. Riggin, 732 F. Supp. 958, 964 (S.D. Ind. 1990). 
 82.  United States v. Diehl Armstrong, No. 1:07cr26, 2008 W.L. 2963056, at *26 (W.D. Pa. July 29, 
2008). 
 83.  737 F.3d 773 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 84.  The “severe mental illness” test was adopted by the Supreme Court in Indiana v. Edwards, 554 
U.S. 164, 177–78 (2008), for determining whether a State may insist on certain defendants being 
represented at trial. 
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represented himself at his trial until a court ordered competency assessment 
revealed a personality disorder that gave him grandiose ideas about his ability to 
represent himself. There was no evidence of severe mental illness. In rejecting 
McKinney’s appeal against the determination that he was competent to stand 
trial, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found no basis to 
conclude that a “personality disorder can, in a clinical sense, constitute a serious 
mental illness.”85 
In contrast, some courts make no distinction between personality disorders 
and mental diseases. In United States v. DeShazer,86 for example, the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals accepted the defendant’s uncontested argument that 
there was no distinction in law between a personality disorder and a mental 
disease for the purposes of § 4241. This approach was followed in United States v. 
Mitchell,87 in which a federal district judge had to determine whether the 
defendant was competent to stand trial in relation to charges of kidnapping and 
unlawful transportation of a minor. Mitchell had extreme religious beliefs, 
including that he was a prophet who received instructions from God to abduct 
his “followers.” The court reasoned Mitchell did suffer from one or more 
personality disorders, but not from a mental disease. Applying DeShazer, the 
court said “it [was] not particularly necessary . . . to determine a specific diagnosis 
in determining competency,”88 but that, in any event, Mitchell’s personality 
disorder did not render him incompetent to stand trial and, even if he had a 
mental disease or defect, he was nevertheless competent. 
This sample of cases illustrates the conflicting views about the relevance of 
the distinction between personality disorders and mental diseases or defects to 
an assessment under § 4241. This conflict reflects what Professor Johnston 
describes as “muddled” approaches by the courts and a misunderstanding that 
there is no meaningful distinction between personality disorders and mental 
diseases or defects.89 
The narrow scope of the current federal tests renders those who have severe 
personality disorders vulnerable. Such defendants may suffer from very 
debilitating personality disorders that can significantly impact their ability to 
understand and evaluate information and to make and communicate decisions. 
This in turn places at risk the defendant’s ability to receive a fair trial and the 
integrity and accuracy of the trial itself. 
2. Unrepresented defendants 
The first prong of the Dusky test focuses upon the defendant’s ability “to 
consult with his lawyer” and resembles the part of § 4241 that refers to a 
defendant’s ability “to assist properly in his defense.” Neither test provides 
 
 85.  McKinney, 737 F.3d at 778. 
 86.  554 F.3d 1281 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 87.  706 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (D. Utah. 2010). 
 88.  Id. at 1193. 
 89.  Johnston, supra note 77. 
COLLINS - BOOK PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2019  4:44 PM 
172 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 82:157 
guidance on how a court should determine if an unrepresented defendant is 
competent to stand trial without the assistance of counsel. This issue has 
produced vexing decisions from the Supreme Court in Godinez v. Moran90 and 
Indiana v. Edwards,91 which highlight a significant deficiency in the current law. 
The right of a defendant to have an attorney is a comparatively recent 
development that post-dates the origins of the common law doctrine concerning 
a defendant’s competence to stand trial.92 The Supreme Court did not affirm a 
defendant’s right to a state-provided defense attorney as a constitutional right 
until three years after it decided Dusky.93 Even more recently, in Faretta v. 
California,94 the Supreme Court held that a defendant in a state criminal trial had 
the right to decline the services of an appointed attorney and could represent 
herself provided that her decision was made “voluntarily” and “intelligently.” 
The Court said: 
Although not stated in the [Sixth] Amendment in so many words, the right to self-
representation—to make one’s own defense personally—is . . . necessarily implied by 
the structure of the Amendment. The right to defend is given directly to the accused; 
for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails.95 
The principle underscoring the Court’s decision, its desire to uphold the 
defendant’s right to self-determination, can be difficult to apply in cases where a 
defendant’s competence to stand trial is in issue. This difficulty is illustrated by 
the conflicting decisions in Moran and Edwards, where the Supreme Court 
placed different emphasis on a defendant’s rights to self-determination and a fair 
trial. 
Moran shot dead three people in Nevada, including his former wife, after 
which he endeavored to kill himself.96 After he initially pleaded not guilty, two 
psychiatrists assessed Moran and concluded that he was competent to stand trial. 
The State then announced its intention to seek the death penalty. At his next 
court appearance, Moran said he wished to dismiss his attorney and plead guilty 
because he did not want his counsel to mount a defense or present any mitigating 
evidence during the sentencing phase of his trial. The trial judge granted Moran’s 
requests after applying Faretta, concluding that Moran had “knowingly and 
intelligently” waived his right to counsel and that his guilty pleas were “freely and 
voluntarily given.” After he was sentenced to death, Moran applied to set aside 
his convictions on the grounds that he was not mentally competent to represent 
himself. This application and Moran’s subsequent appeals were dismissed by the 
 
 90.  509 U.S. 389 (1993). 
 91.  554 U.S. 164 (2008). 
 92.  In England, a defendant charged with a felony was not entitled to counsel as of right until 1836 
following the passing of the Trial for Felony Act, 6 & 7 Will. IV. 114, although counsel were permitted 
to assist any defendant charged with treason from 1696. See John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before 
the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 309 (1978). 
 93.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–43 (1963). 
 94.  422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975). 
 95.  Id. at 819–20. 
 96.  Moran, 509 U.S. at 391–96. 
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state appellate courts and the United States District Court for Nevada. The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, however, allowed Moran’s appeal. It reasoned that a 
defendant’s competence to waive his constitutional right to an attorney required 
a higher level of mental functioning than that required to stand trial. The State 
appealed. By a seven-to-two majority, the Supreme Court overturned the Court 
of Appeals decision and ruled that the Dusky test also governed a defendant’s 
competence to dispense with his counsel and plead guilty.97 
In Edwards,98 decided fifteen years later, a majority of the Supreme Court 
held that a defendant could be competent to stand trial but not necessarily 
competent to represent himself. Edwards, who suffered schizophrenia, shot and 
wounded a security officer when trying to steal a pair of shoes from a department 
store. He was initially found incompetent, but later gained competence after 
receiving treatment in a psychiatric facility. When his trial commenced, Edwards 
asked to dismiss his assigned attorney and represent himself. Those applications 
were declined. Following his conviction, Edwards appealed on the basis that his 
constitutional right to defend himself had been violated. The Indiana appellate 
courts agreed with Edwards and ordered a new trial. The State successfully 
appealed to the Supreme Court. Justice Breyer, for the majority, said that “the 
Constitution permits States to insist upon representation by counsel for those 
competent enough to stand trial under Dusky but who still suffer from severe 
mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial 
proceedings by themselves.”99 
The Court in Edwards conferred upon trial courts the discretion to require 
representation for defendants suffering from severe mental illness.100 The Court 
did not, however, explain what standard was required for a defendant to defend 
himself without counsel in a contested trial. Instead, it was content to leave this 
issue to trial judges, who the Court said “will often prove best able to make more 
fine-tuned mental capacity decisions, tailored to the individualized circumstances 
of a particular defendant.”101 
One possible route to rationalize these decisions is to view Edwards as a 
discrete exception to the Dusky test. The “exception” approach reasons that a 
defendant may be competent to stand trial, waive counsel, and enter a guilty plea, 
but may still not be competent to undertake the more complex task of 
representing himself at a contested trial.102 This approach defers to the principles 
of autonomy and self-determination evident in Faretta by creating a very narrow 
exception to a defendant’s right to dismiss counsel on the basis that, absent a 
 
 97.  Id. at 396–97. 
 98.  554 U.S. 164, 177–78 (2008). 
 99.  Id. at 178. 
 100.  See United States v. Ferguson, 560 F.3d 1060, 1070 n.6 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. DeShazer, 
554 F.3d 1281, 1290 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 101.  Edwards, 554 U.S. at 177. 
 102.  Joanmarie I. Davoli, Physically Present, Yet Mentally Absent, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 313, 
323 (2009); Eulen E. Jang, Mental Capacity: Reevaluating the Standards, 43 G.A. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 531, 
537 (2015). 
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serious mental condition, defendants possess the “right to represent themselves 
and go down in flames if they wished.”103 
Edwards has, however, required both state104 and federal courts to manage 
defendants who represent themselves for reasons that are not objectively 
rational.105 For example, in United States v. Roof,106 the defendant was diagnosed 
with “Social Anxiety Disorder, possible Autistic Spectrum Disorder, Mixed 
Substance Abuse Disorder, depression by history, possible Schizoid Personality 
Disorder, and possible Avoidant Personality Disorder.” He faced the death 
penalty and elected to represent himself in sentencing and present no mitigation 
witnesses. The court determined that it had no discretion to deny Roof’s 
constitutional right to self-representation, despite his legal strategy being 
unsound. The decision reiterates the high standard in Edwards for intervening in 
a defendant’s choice to dispense with counsel. 
Some scholars have argued that the Court in Edwards was motivated by a fear 
that the spectacle of incompetent unrepresented defendants would bring the 
criminal justice system into disrepute.107 This argument refers to the Court’s 
citation of a psychiatrist’s rhetorical criticism of the current law: “how in the 
world can our legal system allow an insane man to defend himself?”108 Professor 
Davoli said it was “startling” that the Court in Edwards acknowledged its 
discomfort with unrepresented incompetent defendants but chose not to address 
the inherent flaws in Dusky.109 
The unsatisfactory state of the law stems from two troublesome aspects of 
Moran and Edwards. First, a defendant’s competence to dispense with his 
attorney and plead guilty is assessed using the Dusky test, which was developed 
in the context of a represented defendant. Dusky did not purport to address the 
situation of an unrepresented defendant. Second, in Edwards, the Court 
recognized the limitations of the Dusky test but failed to provide any meaningful 
guidance on how a trial court should assess a defendant’s competence to 
represent themselves in a contested hearing. 
3. Rationality: a misunderstood concept 
In Dusky, the Court said that to be competent a defendant needs to have the 
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding and have a rational understanding of the proceedings against 
himself. This bore close similarity to the approach taken in Youtsey.110 
Significantly, however, the Court did not explain what test it had in mind when it 
 
 103.  United States v. Johnson, 610 F.3d 1138, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 104.  Johnston, supra note 77, at 2127. 
 105.  See e.g., United States v. Bernard, 708 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 106. United States v. Roof, 2:15-CR-00472, at *16 (D.S.C. Jan. 18, 2017). 
 107.  Tiffany Frigenti, Note, Flying Solo Without a License: The Right of Pro Se Defendants to Crash 
and Burn—People v. Smith, 28 TOURO L. REV. 1019, 1043–44 (2013); Jang, supra note 102, at 549–50. 
 108.  Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177 (2008). 
 109.  Davoli, supra note 102, at 324–25. 
 110.  Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937, 943–44 (6th Cir. 1899). 
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stipulated the need for rational understanding. This has led to both 
jurisprudential and conceptual uncertainties. 
The jurisprudential uncertainties are illustrated by comments made in Moran 
and Edwards that overlook the rationality prong of Dusky. To understand those 
comments, it is necessary to recall that, in Drope, the Court applied Missouri 
legislation, which, like § 4241, omits any reference to “rationality.” The 
distinction between the Dusky test and the legislative test applied by the Court 
in Drope was subsequently blurred in Moran and Edwards. Writing for the 
majority in Moran, Justice Thomas treated the Dusky test as identical to the test 
applied by the Court in Drope even though the Court in Drope made no 
reference to the rationality criterion found in Dusky.111 
Similarly, in Edwards, after setting out the Dusky test, Justice Breyer said: 
Drope repeats that standard . . . it “has long been accepted that a person whose mental 
condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the 
proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense 
may not be subjected to a trial.”112 
The merger of the Dusky and Drope tests by the majorities in Moran and 
Edwards has had the unfortunate effect of diluting the significance of the 
rationality ingredient of the Dusky test. One commentator lamented that 
[t]he Dusky rationality standard was a progressive step with widespread influence. 
Sadly, its significance is fading, even as the standard itself maintains familiarity. Its 
important requirement for rationality is slipping into oblivion with nary a word.113 
Judicial uncertainties about the ongoing role of the rationality component of 
the Dusky test may be attributed to concerns that “a concept like rational 
understanding is difficult to define.”114 This observation arose in the context of a 
challenge to the constitutionality of the proposed execution of a Mr. Panetti for 
the murder of his parents-in-law. There was psychiatric evidence that, although 
Panetti understood the State intended to execute him for murder, his 
understanding was based on the delusional belief that he was really to be 
executed to prevent him from continuing to preach. The Court accepted Panetti 
had been denied an adequate opportunity to argue his right not to be subjected 
to cruel and unusual punishment. 
Others have suggested that the rationality concept suffers from vagueness and 
an absence of consensus as to its exact meaning.115 The rationality requirement 
may also undermine a defendant’s right to self-determination when the 
assessment is based solely on objective considerations. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to construct a coherent definition by drawing on 
the distinction in Dusky between a defendant’s factual understanding and 
rational understanding, which can be traced back to Dyson’s Case in the 
 
 111.  Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993). 
 112.  Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 170 (2008) (emphasis added). 
 113.  Felthous, supra note 58, at 20. 
 114.  Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 959 (2007). 
 115.  LAW COMMISSION OF ENGLAND AND WALES, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 197, UNFITNESS TO 
PLEAD 3–48 (2010). 
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nineteenth century. For example, in Panetti, it was insufficient that the defendant 
knew that he was to be executed for murder. A rational understanding could not 
be affected by pathological delusions such as the belief that he was to be executed 
to stop him preaching. The American Academy of Psychiatry and Law116 
distinguishes “factual understanding” from “rational understanding” by 
providing the following two examples. First, a defendant “may have an accurate 
factual understanding of the legal process as it applies to ‘ordinary humans.’” But 
because he suffers “grandiose religious delusions” and “therefore believes that 
no earthly court can punish him,” he lacks a rational understanding that if found 
guilty he would be subject to imprisonment. Second, while a defendant may not 
initially know key facets of the proceedings against him, such as the maximum 
number of years a sentence carries, he would nonetheless have factual 
understanding if he “could learn the necessary information” and his “initial 
deficits only indicate a lack of information rather than any impairment stemming 
from a mental disorder.” 
The rationality component of Dusky should not be consigned to history. 
Instead, any defendant must, when making important decisions in relation to her 
trial, have an understanding that is unaffected by delusions or other genuine 
disorders that adversely affect her ability to make decisions based upon reality. 
B. Institutional Shortcomings 
1. Clinical Assessments 
The jurisprudential and conceptual weaknesses in the current tests for 
assessing a defendant’s competence to stand trial have created a lacuna that 
judges and lawyers, due to shortcomings in their skills and training, have been 
unable to fill. Instead, health professionals have assumed greater prominence in 
the assessment of a defendant’s competence to stand trial. While competency 
decisions are ultimately for the courts, judges have become increasingly reliant 
on evidence from health professionals,117 who in most instances are trained either 
in psychology or psychiatry.118 The intersection of law and health sciences in this 
area is fraught with opportunity for misunderstanding and confusion between 
health professionals, defendants, lawyers, and judges. This is partly because the 
law has evolved slowly and continues to reflect vestiges of the eighteenth-century 
common law. Conversely, psychiatry and psychology have developed rapidly 
from forming diagnoses based on subjective assessments of patients to evidence-
based diagnoses using population-based data about psychiatric and psychological 
 
 116.  Mossman, et al., supra note 1, at S45–46. 
 117.  Compare Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1048–49 (2017) (noting that while states have 
discretion in enforcing the prohibition on executing intellectually disabled defendants, they must be 
informed by medical expertise), and Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 721–23 (2014) (same), with Wieter v. 
Settle, 193 F. Supp. 318, 321–22 (W.D. Mo. 1961) (treating psychiatric conclusions as “merely opinion 
testimony,” which “is not and cannot be legally binding”). 
 118.  MELTON ET AL., supra note 17, at 135. 
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conditions.119 Further, there is no direct alignment between the legal construct of 
competence to stand trial and conventional diagnostic categories in psychiatry or 
psychology. The language of psychiatrists and psychologists on the one hand and 
that of lawyers and judges on the other creates significant room for 
misunderstanding.120 
These challenges are exacerbated by concerns about variations between 
psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers when reporting on a defendant’s 
competence. This issue was exposed in a study of the assessments of sixty 
evaluators in Virginia and Alabama who had collectively conducted more than 
7000 competency evaluations.121 The researchers found a statistically significant 
amount of variance in competency evaluations due to differences between 
evaluators.122 They also concluded that the evaluator’s professional training was 
a significant predictor of the evaluator’s recommendations, with social workers 
3.51 times more likely than psychologists to find a defendant incompetent, and 
psychologists 2.04 times more likely than psychiatrists to make that same 
finding.123 
2. Competency Screening Instruments 
In 1965, the forensic psychiatrist Dr. Ames Robey developed a checklist for 
assessing a defendant’s competence to stand trial.124 Researchers have since 
constructed at least thirteen competency screening instruments that are used to 
varying degrees. 
One of the most comprehensive screening instruments is the MacArthur 
Competence Assessment Tool—Criminal Adjudication (MacCAT-CA), which 
comprises twenty-two topics, sixteen of which do not address the defendant’s 
actual case. Instead, the defendant is asked, for example, to consider a 
hypothetical case about a violent assault between two acquaintances over a game 
of pool.125 The American Academy of Psychiatry and Law has explained: 
Weaknesses of the MacCAT–CA include its limited focus on the complexity of the 
defendant’s case, the defendant’s memory of events, and legal demands such as 
appropriate behavior in court . . . . [I]ts verbal demands may exceed the expressive 
 
 119.  Joel Paris, Canadian Psychiatry Across 5 Decades: From Clinical Inference to Evidence–Based 
Practice, 45 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 34, 34–39 (2000) (reviewing developments in the practice of psychiatry 
in Canada); see INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON MENTAL HEALTH (Hamid Ghodse ed., 2011) 
(describing the practice of psychiatry in 91 countries). 
 120.  David Faigman & Carl E. Fisher, Towards a Jurisprudence of Psychiatric Evidence: Examining 
the Challenges of Reasoning from Group Data in Psychiatry to Individual Decisions in the Law, 69 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 685 (2015); see also discussion supra Part III.A.1. 
 121.  Daniel C. Murrie, Marcus T. Boccaccini, Patricia A. Zapf, Janet I. Warren & Craig E. 
Henderson, Clinician Variation in Findings of Competence to Stand Trial, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 
177, 181–82 (2008). 
 122.  Id. at 185. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Ames Robey, Criteria for Competency to Stand Trial: A Checklist for Psychiatrists, 122 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 616 (1965). 
 125.  Richard Rogers & Jill Johansson-Love, Evaluating Competency to Stand Trial With Evidence–
Based Practice, 37 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 450, 453–54 (2009). 
COLLINS - BOOK PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2019  4:44 PM 
178 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 82:157 
capabilities of mentally retarded defendants who nonetheless understand their charges 
and can converse satisfactorily with counsel. Evaluees with severe thought disorders, 
memory impairment, or problems with concentration may not be able to complete 
assessments with the instrument.126 
Another screening instrument, the Evaluation of Competency to Stand Trial 
– Revised (ECST-R) was first published in 2003.127 It was designed to specifically 
address what the authors say are the three prongs of the Dusky test. The features 
of the ECST-R have been said to make it “potentially attractive as a tool for 
examiners to use in the assessment” of a defendant’s competence to stand trial.128 
The same authors, however, express concerns about some of the instrument’s 
rating scales and the “internal validity of the scores obtained” that “appear to 
permit gross incongruencies between . . . ratings and scale interpretations.”129 
The inherent weakness with any competency screening instrument is that 
there are no objective criteria against which to test its validity. This is because it 
is impossible to clinically assess how a defendant found incompetent would in 
fact perform in a trial setting.130 Thus, while some screening tools may be useful 
to differentiate between defendants who are competent to stand trial and those 
who are not, commentators acknowledge the variability and varying usefulness 
of competence screening instruments.131 
These deficiencies are compounded when dealing with admissibility of 
evidence through the application of the test in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals.132 The requirement in Daubert for “a valid scientific connection 
to the pertinent inquiry” is particularly in question when clinicians rely on 
screening instruments that do not specifically address either § 4241 or the Dusky 
test, or which are constructed upon hypothetical scenarios not connected to the 
defendant’s circumstances. Thus, legitimate questions may be asked about the 
relevance of questions about acquaintances fighting over a pool game to a case 
where the defendant believes he was commanded by God to abduct and rape his 
victims.133 
 
 126.  Mossman, et al., supra note 1, at S42. 
 127.  Richard Rogers, Rebecca L. Johnson, Chad E. Tillbrook, Mary A. Martin & Kenneth W. Sewell, 
Assessing Dimensions and Competency to Stand Trial: Construct Validation of the ECST–R Assessment 
(2003), https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1121&context=resec_faculty_pubs 
[https://perma.cc/FBK6-XBTS]. 
 128.  MELTON ET AL., supra note 17, at 153. 
 129.  Id. at 154. 
 130.  See Patricia A. Zapf & Ronald Roesch, Evaluation of Competence to Stand Trial in Adults, in 
FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS IN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LAW: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS 17, 24 (Ronald 
Roesch & Patricia A. Zapf eds., 2013) (“[T]here can be no hard criterion against which to test the validity 
of competency evaluations because we do not have a test of how incompetent defendants would perform 
in the actual criterion situations.”). 
 131.  THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND 
INSTRUMENTS (2nd ed. 2006); MELTON ET AL., supra note 17, at 154; Patricia A. Zapf & Jodi L. Viljoen, 
Issues and Considerations Regarding the Use of Assessment Instruments in the Evaluation and 
Competency to Stand Trial, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 351 (2003). 
 132.  509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 133.  See United States v. Mitchell, 706 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (D. Utah. 2010). 
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That so many competency screening tests have emerged over the past four 
decades underscores the concern that members of the psychiatric and 
psychological communities do not agree about which type of instrument is most 
helpful. These uncertainties, when combined with the reported weaknesses of 
several of the instruments and the challenge for new instruments to pass the 
Daubert standards, suggest that judges and lawyers—not psychologists or 
psychiatrists—should lead any inquiry into a defendant’s competence. The 
discrepancies in recommendations between mental health workers reinforce this 
conclusion. 
3. Attorney Deficiencies 
Lawyers rarely have the training required to identify mental health issues that 
may be subtly masked. “[A] lawyer is not a trained mental health professional 
capable of accurately assessing the effects of paranoid delusions on the client’s 
mental processes.”134 
Additionally, defense lawyers are invariably too overwhelmed and under-
resourced to give the attention required by a client who may require a 
competence assessment. One commentator has noted “[t]he ‘meet ‘em and plead 
‘em model of representation common in jurisdictions across the United States.”135 
Public defense lawyers “cannot interview clients, investigate the facts of the case, 
or file appropriate motions, let alone effectively negotiate plea bargains . . . . 
Hurried conversations in the courtroom itself, or perhaps a hallway or holding 
cell, are the best that most public defenders can do.”136 The vast majority of 
defendants can be expected to face such circumstances, as over eighty percent of 
criminal cases are assigned to publicly funded lawyers.137 It is a tragic reality that 
attorneys are often unable to identify and assist clients who are not competent to 
stand trial. Law reports are replete with cases in which defense lawyers have 
provided ineffective representation, many amounting to ineffective assistance of 
counsel, by failing to investigate or present to the court obvious concerns about 
a defendant’s competence.138 
 
 134.  United States v. Salley, 246 F. Supp. 2d 970, 976 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (citing United States v. Timmins, 
301 F.3d 974, 981 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 135.  Lisa Kern Griffin, State Incentives, Plea Bargaining Regulation, and the Failed Market for 
Indigent Defense, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. no. 3, 2017 at 94. 
 136.  See id. at 95 (citing Tina Peng, I’m a Public Defender. It’s impossible for me to do a good job 
representing my clients, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/our-
public-defender-system-isnt-just-broken—its-unconstitutional/2015/09/03/aadf2b6c-519b-11e5-9812-
92d5948a40f8_story.html?utm_term=.52daef163282) [https://perma.cc/LMT6-3Y5T]. 
 137.  Id. at 91 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SELECTED FINDINGS, 
INDIGENT DEFENSE 1(1992). 
 138.  See, e.g., Hummel v. Rosemeyer, 564 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2009); Bloom v. Calderon, 132 F.3d 1267 
(9th Cir. 1997); Becton v. Barnett, 920 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1990); Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589 (5th 
Cir. 1990); Blakeney v. United States, 77 A.3d 328 (D.C. 2013); United States ex rel Newman v. Rednour, 
917 F. Supp. 2d 765 (N.D. Ill. 2012); Harris By and Through Ramseyer v. Blodgett, 853 F. Supp. 1239 
(W.D. Wash. 1994); Matthews v. State, 596 S.E.2d 49 (S.C. 2004). 
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Sadly, attorneys are rarely able to fulfill the role envisaged in United States v. 
Duhon. There the court, after hearing from medical experts and an independent 
trial lawyer called as a court-appointed expert, stated that a “multi-disciplinary 
approach is often critical in resolving competency issues, particularly where, as 
here, the focus is on a defendant’s ability to assist counsel.”139 In such cases, “one 
of the most evident issues is whether the assessing professional, usually a 
psychiatrist or a psychologist, really knows what would normally go into the 
defense of the case.”140 
4. Judicial Deficiencies 
Clinicians now occupy a pivotal role in competency assessments.141 The 
reasons for this result can be distilled to three factors. 
First, like attorneys, judges are unlikely to have the technical knowledge 
required to question and challenge assessments made by psychiatrists and 
psychologists. Thus, while ultimately the decision is within the exclusive domain 
of the judge, in reality, there is a high degree of judicial adoption of the views put 
forward by clinicians.142 As noted by Judge Harry Edwards, “the judicial system 
is encumbered by judges . . . who generally lack the scientific expertise necessary 
to comprehend and evaluate forensic evidence in an informed manner.”143 
 Second, the adversarial process is not an optimum forum for testing complex 
scientific evidence. The adversarial model is predicated on the basis that a 
criminal trial is “a dispute between two sides in a position of theoretical equality 
before a court which must decide on the outcome of the contest.”144 This theory 
does not reflect the reality of most prosecutions today in which the defense 
attorney is more likely to direct his limited resources towards achieving a 
resolution through a plea bargain than to embark on the time-consuming, 
challenging, and potentially expensive task of testing the prosecution’s arguments 
concerning a defendant’s competence to stand trial. Third, the judicial system 
involves a “case-by-case” adjudicatory approach,145 which does not align with the 
training of psychologists and psychiatrists who, in the pursuit of evidence-based 
methodologies, apply data developed from groups to individual cases.146 
 
 139.  United States v. Duhon, 104 F. Supp. 2d 663, 669 (W.D. La. 2000). 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  See Patricia A. Zapf, Karen L. Hubbard, Virginia G. Cooper, Melissa C. Wheeles & Kathleen 
A. Ronan, Have the Courts Abdicated their Responsibility for Determination of Competency to Stand Trial 
to Clinicians?, 4 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 27 (2004). 
 142.  Keith R. Cruise & Richard Rogers, An Analysis of Competency to Stand Trial: An Integration 
of Case Law and Clinical Knowledge, 16 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 35, 35–36 (1998); Zapf et al., supra note 141. 
 143.  Harry T. Edwards, Reflecting on the Findings of the National Academy of Sciences Committee 
on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Science Community, Address to the National Commission on 
Forensic Science, Washington, D.C. (2014). 
 144.  Mirjan R. Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Morals of Criminal Procedure: 
A Comparative Study, 21 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 563 (1972–73). 
 145.  Edwards, supra note 143. 
 146.  Faigman, et al., supra note 120; David L. Faigman, Judges as “Amateur Scientists,” 86 B.U. L. 
REV. 1207, 1220–24 (2006). 
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Judges generally defer to clinicians’ evaluation of a defendant’s competence. 
In one study involving a statutory replication of the Dusky test, which focused 
upon 328 competency determinations in Alabama state courts, researchers found 
that in all but one case the courts accepted the mental health professionals’ 
recommendations.147 All judges interviewed indicated their belief that mental 
health professionals are more qualified to determine whether a defendant is 
competent. One judge even said his job “would be ‘much easier’ if the mental 
health professional would ‘simply state whether the defendant was competent or 
not.’”148 Caution must be exercised before extrapolating studies of state courts’ 
practices into the federal setting. The Alabama study is, however, generally 
consistent with other studies which have found that judges have tended to accept 
the recommendations of health professionals in at least ninety percent of cases.149 
This heavy dependence upon clinicians’ opinions is undesirable, as it leads to 
three adverse consequences. First, judges and lawyers might forgo making their 
own appropriate inquiries. This concern has led to one commentator lamenting 
that “decisionmaking in this area is effectively delegated to clinical evaluators 
making low visibility and essentially unreviewed decisions pursuant to a vague, 
open-textured [clinical] standard.”150 Second, judges risk not properly testing the 
recommendations of clinicians. Judges should test the opinions of clinicians 
through their own observations and should weigh the subtleties of any competing 
contentions from health professionals in their overall assessment. Third, serious 
questions arise about how effectively judges are preserving the fair trial rights of 
defendants whose competence to stand trial is in issue. This places at risk the 
fundamental integrity, legitimacy, and reliability of the criminal justice system. 
IV 
A MORE APPROPRIATE TEST FOR ASSESSING COMPETENCE 
This Part explains the provenance and contents of the effective participation 
test. The test’s origins can be traced to the minimum fair trial rights in Article 
6(3) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. The European Court of Human Rights has said that the 
effective participation standard is an overarching trial right that encompasses 
those set out in Article 6(3).151 
 
 147.  Zapf, et al., supra note 141. 
 148.  Id. at 35. 
 149.  See Cruise & Rogers, supra note 142; Ian Freckelton, Rationality and Flexibility in Assessment 
of Fitness to Stand Trial, 19 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 39 (1996); Stephen D. Hart & Robert D. Hare, 
Predicting Fitness to Stand Trial: The Relative Power of Demographic Criminal and Clinicial Variables, 5 
FORENSIC REP. 53 (1992); James H. Reich & Linda Tookey, Disagreements Between Court and 
Psychiatrist on Competence to Stand Trial, 47 CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 29 (1986). 
 150.  Bruce J. Winick, Reforming Incompetency to Stand Trial and Plead Guilty: A Restated Proposal 
in Response to Professor Bonnie, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 571, 620 (1995). 
 151.  Liselotte van den Anker, Lydia Dalhuisen & Marije Stokkel, Student Paper, Fitness to Stand 
Trial: A General Principle of European Criminal Law?, 7 UTRECHT L. REV. 120 (2011). 
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The effective participation test has been adopted by the Appellate Chamber 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.152 The basic 
elements of this test have also been endorsed by the Law Commission of England 
and Wales.153 The Scottish Law Commission has also recommended Scotland 
follow the European Court of Justice’s approach by adopting an effective 
participation standard for defendants required to stand trial.154 
A. The Matters That a Defendant Must Understand 
The court should inquire into nine trial tasks under an effective participation 
test:155 
1. The defendant must understand the charges she is facing. This involves the defendant 
understanding in general terms how the prosecution says the charge will be proven 
against her. 
2. When deciding how to plead, the defendant must be able to rationally evaluate the 
significance of entering a plea of guilty or not guilty and what consequences will flow 
from that plea. 
3. The defendant must understand the significance of opting for a trial before a judge 
and jury or without a jury, evaluate relevant considerations, and communicate her 
decision rationally. 
4. The defendant should be able to understand the process of challenging jurors for 
cause or peremptorily, evaluate relevant factors, and decide rationally whether to 
challenge a juror. 
5. The defendant must be able to follow the proceeding. This includes understanding 
essential points made by witnesses, understanding the case against her, evaluating 
evidence and trial rulings, deciding how to advance her own defense either in person or 
through counsel, and communicating her decisions in a rational manner. 
6. The defendant must understand what is at stake in her trial. This criterion includes a 
requirement that the defendant understand the significance of any conviction and any 
sentence that may be imposed. 
7. The defendant must be able to instruct her counsel with sufficient rationality so as to 
enable her lawyer to understand and advance the defendant’s account of events and 
challenge those parts of the prosecution case that are in issue. 
8. If unrepresented, a defendant must be able to conduct her own case in a way that 
does not breach her right to a fair trial. 
9. If the defendant elects to give evidence, she must understand the significance of that 
decision. It is crucial that if a defendant gives evidence she genuinely understands 
questions put to her and her the capacity to provide answers in a rational way. 
These nine trial tasks extend beyond a defendant’s capacity to consult with 
his lawyer and his capacity to understand the proceedings against him. The 
effective participation test encompasses all aspects of the defendant’s trial, 
 
 152.  Ian Freckelton & Magda Karagiannakis, Unfitness to Stand Trial under International Criminal 
Law: The Influential Decision of the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia in Relation 
to the Pavle Strugar and its Ramifications, 21 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 611, 614 (2014). 
 153.  LAW COMMISSION OF ENGLAND AND WALES, REPORT NO. 364, UNFITNESS TO PLEAD 10.8–
10.29 (2016). 
 154.  See Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 (ASP 13) § 170. 
 155.  See Stanford v. United Kingdom, App. No. 16757/90, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1994); S.C. v. United 
Kingdom, App No. 60958/00, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 10 (2005). 
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including all decisions that he may be required to make from when he is required 
to plead through to when he is sentenced. On occasion, giving effect to the 
effective participation test may require a suitably qualified person to assist the 
defendant in understanding information and communicating his decision. It may 
also be necessary for the court to provide the defendant with sufficient time to be 
able to carry out these functions. This may be achieved by the court providing 
frequent recesses and engaging the services of a professional evaluator to 
monitor the defendant’s engagement and responsiveness during the trial. 
B. What Level of Understanding Does the Effective Participation Test Entail? 
The effective participation test considers both a defendant’s cognitive 
capacity and his decision-making ability. In its reports advocating an effective 
participation test in England and Wales, the Law Commission suggested a focus 
upon the defendant’s decision-making capacity.156 The consultation paper 
recommended an examination of the defendant’s ability to make “a particular 
decision in relation to a particular set of circumstances.”157 Although some 
commentators have suggested that a capacity-based test is less abstract than tests 
that focus upon a defendant’s cognitive abilities,158 the Law Commission did not 
suggest completely abandoning assessment of cognitive abilities. Instead, it 
recommended assessing reasoning deficiencies in addition to assessing cognitive 
abilities.159 
Less straightforward is whether the rationality requirement should be 
retained if the Supreme Court were to mold the Dusky test into an effective 
participation test. The Law Commission of England and Wales suggested that 
rationality is a concept that suffers from vagueness and is not universally 
understood.160 It argued that requiring a defendant to have a rational 
understanding risks undermining her autonomy simply because her 
understanding may not be rational when judged objectively.161 The Law 
Commission opined that there should not be a “blanket requirement” that a 
defendant’s understanding be rational.162 This approach contrasts with that taken 
in South Australia, which requires an assessment of the defendant’s ability “to 
understand, or to respond rationally to, the charge or the allegations.”163 
 
 156.  LAW COMMISSION OF ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note 153, at 1.46. 
 157.  LAW COMMISSION OF ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note 115, at 2.73. 
 158.  Helen Howard, Unfitness to Plead and the Vulnerable Defendant: An Examination of the Law 
Commission’s Proposals for a New Competency Test, 75 J.C.L. 194, 199 (2011). 
 159.  LAW COMMISSION OF ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note 115, at 3.38. 
 160.  Id. at 3.48–3.58. 
 161.  Id. at 3.52. 
 162.  Id. at 3.54. 
 163.  Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) 269(H) (Austl.); see also LAW REFORM 
COMMISSION OF CANADA, CRIMINAL PROCESS AND MENTAL DISORDER, Working Paper 14, Ottawa, 
31–44 (1975), in which it was recorded that “[i]nstructing counsel is tied to the accused’s participation at 
trial and implies the ability to communicate rationally.” 
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The concern expressed by the Law Commission appears to be partially based 
upon a misapprehension that rationality equates with a defendant acting in his 
best interests. These two concepts should not be conflated. In the context of the 
effective participation test, the rationality requirement means that, when judged 
objectively, the defendant’s capacity to understand, evaluate, make decisions, 
and communicate is unaffected by delusions or other perception-altering 
conditions. This requirement ensures the defendant genuinely receives the 
benefit of his right to a fair trial and can exercise his autonomy in a way that 
enhances the accuracy and dignity of the criminal justice system. 
Uncertainties in English jurisprudence about the meaning of rational 
understanding do not translate into American experiences, where rationality has 
been part of the federal law since Youtsey. The United States has also had the 
further advantage of the Supreme Court’s guidance in Panetti: for a defendant to 
have a rational understanding, her understanding must not be influenced by 
psychotic delusions. 
C. How is the Effective Participation Test Applied? 
An effective participation test requires that a judge’s assessment be informed 
by relevant clinical evidence. This would require psychiatrists and psychologists 
to provide evidence on an ongoing basis about the defendant’s cognitive abilities, 
his capacity to rationally understand and evaluate relevant information, and to 
make and communicate his decisions in a rational manner. The psychiatrist or 
psychologist should provide evidence about any psychiatric or psychological 
disorder that the defendant suffers from, but identification of a mental disease or 
defect should not be determinative. 
Lawyers would also be expected to play a significant role in assisting the 
court, particularly where there is an inquiry into a defendant’s ability to assist 
counsel. In this respect, the overriding responsibility of a defense attorney is to 
discharge her duty as an officer of the court by communicating to the judge freely 
and frankly any concerns she harbors about her client’s competence. Such 
communications must not be encumbered by concerns about client 
confidentiality or instructions from the defendant not to challenge her 
competence.164 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has said that “if defense 
counsel suspects that the defendant is unable to consult with him ‘with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding’ . . . he cannot blindly accept his 
client’s demand that his competency not be challenged.”165 Recognizing the 
significant role of a defense attorney in assessing a defendant’s competence 
reflects the “multi-disciplinary approach” emphasized by the court in Duhon.166 
 
 164.  Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 166 (1986) (stating that “[a]lthough counsel must take all 
reasonable lawful means to attain the objectives of the client, counsel is precluded from taking steps or 
In any way assisting the client in presenting false evidence or otherwise violating the law”). 
 165.  Bundy v. Dugger, 816 F.2d 564, 566–67 n.2 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Thompson v. Wainwright, 787 
F.2d 1447, 1451 (11th Cir. 1986)). 
 166.  104 F. Supp. 2d 663, 669 (W.D. La. 2000). 
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The trial judge must be given every reasonable opportunity to form his own 
view about the defendant’s capacity to effectively participate in his trial. The very 
nature of the effective participation test reasserts the judge’s crucial position in 
making these assessments. This may require a competency assessment hearing in 
which the defendant is required to give evidence relevant to his capacity to 
effectively participate in his trial. Such a hearing may be particularly useful where 
it is contended prior to trial that the defendant needs to be able to give evidence 
to advance his defense but lacks the capacity to do so. But such a hearing would 
need to be carefully controlled by the trial judge to ensure the right against self-
incrimination is respected. 
This process may add to the time and costs associated with conducting a trial. 
Nevertheless, these concerns must not detract from the ultimate goals of ensuring 
a defendant receives a fair trial; maintaining the integrity, legitimacy, and 
accuracy of the criminal justice system; and preserving the autonomy and dignity 
of defendants. 
V 
WHY THE EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION TEST SHOULD BE ADOPTED 
There are three key advantages to the effective participation test. First, it 
makes the cause of incompetence a peripheral consideration. Second, it provides 
one test for all contexts. Third, it returns judicial responsibilities to the forefront. 
A. The Peripheral Relevance of the Cause of a Defendant’s Incompetence 
By focusing on a defendant’s competence to understand, evaluate, decide, 
and communicate in relation to key trial issues, the effective participation test 
ensures the causes of the incompetence are of secondary relevance. The current 
federal laws, however, were developed to ensure that a finding of incompetence 
was reserved for cases where the cause of the incompetence was clearly 
established. This in turn has placed a high onus on those who wish to appeal 
decisions by trial judges not to inquire into a defendant’s competence.167 
As Part III demonstrates, any genuine inquiry should not be restricted by the 
causes of the defendant’s incompetence but rather by the consequences of the 
defendant’s condition, namely, her effective participation. Defendants who suffer 
from, for example, personality disorders, or who fail to meet the narrow criteria 
in § 4241 and Dusky, would be better assessed through the lens of the effective 
participation test. A key advantage of the effective participation test is that it is 
unencumbered by the current legislative criterion that requires a defendant to be 
suffering a “mental disease or defect” and the uncertainty about whether a 
personality disorder is sufficient. The true variety of disorders that may impede 
 
 167.  United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34, 46 (2d Cir. 1998); Watts v. Singletary, 87 F.3d 1282, 1289 
(11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Nichols, 56 F.3d 403, 411 (2d Cir. 1995); Sheley v. Singletary, 955 F.2d 
1434, 1438 (11th Cir. 1992); Bruce v. Estelle, 483 F.2d 1031, 1043 (5th Cir. 1973). 
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a defendant’s ability to stand trial is best accounted for by placing the cause of 
the defendant’s incompetence on the periphery. 
B. A Unitary Test 
As explained in Part III, the standard of competence required by the Due 
Process Clause for pleading guilty and waiving one’s right to counsel can be 
accurately described as arbitrary and inconsistent. This unsatisfactory state of 
affairs has come to pass because, as the Supreme Court recognized in Edwards, 
the Dusky test as applied in Moran was inappropriate for assessing a defendant’s 
competence to proceed unrepresented in a contested trial. As Justice Blackmun 
said in his Moran dissent, “a person who is ‘competent’ to play basketball is not 
thereby ‘competent’ to play the violin.”168 But the Court in Edwards elected not 
to address the shortcomings in the Dusky test, leading to the inconsistent and ad 
hoc state of the current law. 
In contrast, the effective participation test is a unitary test that applies in all 
circumstances. It requires an assessment of whether, in each situation to be faced 
by the defendant, he can effectively participate in the proceeding. It recognizes 
that a defendant’s capacity to effectively participate in one phase of his trial does 
not necessarily translate to another phase. A defendant may be able to effectively 
instruct counsel to enter a plea of guilty but not have the capacity to effectively 
give evidence and be subject to cross-examination. Similarly, a defendant who 
has the capacity to provide effective instructions to counsel may not have the 
capacity to self-represent. 
The advantages of the effective participation test are well illustrated by 
returning to Moran, in which the defendant chose to dispense with his defense 
attorney and plead guilty because he did not want to mount a defense against the 
state’s case for the death sentence. Had the trial court applied the effective 
participation test, it would have been compelled to inquire into whether Moran 
genuinely had the capacity to understand the nature and consequences of his 
decision to dispense with his counsel and plead guilty. But as Justice Blackmun 
correctly noted, the state sought to convict and sentence to death a defendant 
who was “helpless to defend himself.”169 
C. Judicial Responsibilities 
The “failure to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant’s right 
not to be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of his 
due process right to a fair trial.”170 Usually competency hearings are triggered by 
an application from defense counsel, but a competency hearing can also be 
carried out upon the motion of a prosecutor or by the trial judge acting on her 
own volition. 
 
 168.  Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 413 (1993). 
 169.  Id. at 417. 
 170.  Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975) (citing Pate v. Robinson, 388 U.S. 375 (1966)). 
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Currently, expert testimony constitutes the primary source of evidence from 
which a trial judge determines competency. However, as observed in Part III, the 
degree to which many judges now depend upon the views of mental health 
experts has raised legitimate questions about whether trial judges are delegating 
their judicial responsibilities to health professionals. 
The effective participation test continues to rely upon expert medical 
testimony, but it requires more engagement from a trial judge, particularly in 
cases where the defendant seeks to represent herself or to undertake complex 
functions such as presenting evidence. In these cases, the trial judge is required 
to draw upon her experience and understanding of how a criminal trial is 
conducted and how a defendant’s rights to a fair trial are honored. The trial judge 
is expected to make her own observations of the defendant, examine the 
defendant in court, and consider other sources of information such as the 
observations of counsel and lay testimony. Judges and not just health 
professionals must bear the burden of fully assessing a defendant’s competence 
to participate effectively in her trial. 
This was demonstrated with resounding effect in United States v. Gigante,171 
which involved charges against the head of the Genovese family, part of the 
criminal organization known as La Cosa Nostra. In a hearing to assess Gigante’s 
competence to stand trial concerning labor payoffs, extortions, mail frauds, and 
conspiracies to commit murder, four psychiatrists initially concluded that he was 
not competent to stand trial. In reaching their conclusions, the psychiatrists 
considered records from 1969 relating to Gigante’s regular admissions at a 
psychiatric hospital. The federal judge, however, was concerned that Gigante was 
feigning his symptoms and held a hearing to determine the genuineness of his 
alleged mental incapacity. That hearing involved a detailed inquiry into Gigante’s 
conduct throughout most of his life and resulted in the court concluding he had, 
for decades, engaged in an elaborate sham in which he pretended to be mentally 
defective while at the same time directing and controlling a sophisticated criminal 
enterprise. Gigante was found competent to stand trial, convicted of multiple 
charges and sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment.172 His appeal challenging 
the competency determination was dismissed by the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals.173 
Gigante demonstrates how trial judges can push back against what might at 
first appear to be persuasive medical opinions concerning a defendant’s 
competence. Defendants who feign their incompetence can be particularly 
challenging for all involved in a criminal trial. One authority has noted that 
“seasoned clinicians often rely on their own individualistic perspectives in 
deciding when to assess for malingering . . . . Unfortunately, the overreliance on 
clinical judgment can be the source of misdiagnosis and inaccurate information 
 
 171.  925 F. Supp. 967 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 172.  United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 173.  Id. at 84. 
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given to the Court.”174 Ironically, psychiatrists have in recent years developed 
tools that can now accurately assess the likelihood that a defendant is feigning 
symptoms. The designers of the ECST-R Competency Screening Tool have, for 
example, also developed an “Atypical Presentation Scale,” which is designed to 
identify feigned incompetence. Studies have shown this is a particularly useful 
screen for identifying malingering in competency evaluations.175 Thus, while 
judges must be alert to the fallibilities of medical opinions, health professionals 
can play a significant role in providing information that may assist a judge in 
deciding whether a defendant is competent to stand trial. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
The deficiencies in the current law governing a defendant’s competence to 
stand trial place at risk defendants with severe mental illness and other conditions 
that affect their ability to participate. This in turn jeopardizes the rights of these 
defendants to a fair trial. Equally disturbing is that the current federal law risks 
undermining the integrity and dignity of the criminal law, a point observed by 
Justice Blackmun in Moran. The current federal law also compromises the 
accuracy of verdicts by placing on trial defendants who are unable to effectively 
challenge allegations against them. 
The current federal law is almost entirely a product of judicial innovation. 
The federal statute was substantially devised by federal judges serving on a 
committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States, and the Supreme 
Court’s efforts to divine a test led it to adopt recommendations of the Solicitor 
General in Dusky. Regrettably, the Supreme Court has not seized opportunities 
presented in subsequent cases to address deficiencies in the Dusky test. The 
Dusky test could evolve into an effective participation test by requiring 
competency assessments to focus upon the defendant’s capacity to understand 
relevant information, evaluate that information, make decisions in relation to 
that information, and communicate his decisions. 
Judges who become apprised of the deficiencies in the current federal law 
governing competency will wish to ensure the judiciary constructs a pathway 
through the current quagmire. Those same judges will want to ensure public 
confidence in the procedures by making sure that judges, and not health 
professionals, resume the central role in determining competency issues. 
Concerns about the adequacy of competency tests are currently being 
examined in several cognate jurisdictions. Those jurisdictions have identified 
significant shortcomings in tests that are based upon the common law or that were 
devised in an era when the focus was on defendants found to be suffering from 
mental diseases or defects. While there is no universally accepted formula for 
 
 174.  Michael J. Vitacco, Richard Rogers, Jason Gabal & Janice Munizza, An Evaluation of 
Malingering Screens With Competency to Stand Trial Patients: A Known–Groups Comparison, 31 L. & 
HUM. BEHAV. 249, 250 (2007). 
 175.  Id. at 251, 258. 
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assessing a defendant’s competence to stand trial, the effective participation test 
has been accepted by the European Court of Human Rights and by Scotland. It 
is also the test recommended by the Law Commission for England and Wales. 
The effective participation test has several advantages over the existing 
federal tests. Those advantages include that it provides a unitary test that can 
apply to all phases of a criminal trial and that it can be engaged whenever a 
defendant’s competence is in issue, regardless of the reasons for their 
incompetence. The effective participation test relies to some extent upon the 
evidence of health professionals. Nevertheless, the assessment of a defendant’s 
ability to effectively participate in her trial is quintessentially a judicial decision 
that is based upon a trial judge’s knowledge of what the defendant needs to 
understand, evaluate, decide, and communicate in the context of her trial. The 
effective participation test rightfully places the trial judge, and not medical 
professionals, at the epicenter of the assessment of a defendant’s competence to 
stand trial. 
 
